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NOTES
WHEN A RAILROAD BECOMES A WAREHOUSE
MAN
The extraordinary liability of a carrier as an insurer where goods
committed to its charge for carriage are injured or lost in the course of
transportation is everywhere admitted. But the contract of a carrier
being not only to carry, but also to deliver, it follows that the custody
of the goods by the carrier must extend beyond as well as precede,
the period of their transit from the place of consignment to that of
destination.
The responsibility of the carrier for goods awaiting transportation
depends upon the nature of their delivery. Where the goods are
delivered to the carrier for immediate transportation and nothing re-
mains to be done by the shipper, the liability of the carrier as such
attaches at once; that is, when the shipper surrenders the entire cus-
tody of his goods and the carrier receives complete control of them for
shipment at the earliest practical opportunity, the extraordinary lia-
bility of a common carrier begins. "If there remains anything to be
done by the shipper before the goods are ready for transportation, the
storage of them in the carrier's warehouse is an accommodation and
convenience to the shipper, and the carrier is liable only as a ware-
houseman." Alsop v. Southern Esp. Co., 104 N. C. 278.
The arrival of goods at- their destination does not at once termi-
nate the carrier's responsibility as such. Generally speaking, the duty
of a common carrier is to convey and deliver safely and securely, and
its responsibility as a carrier continues until it has made an actual
delivery, or dcne that which may be considered an equivalent or a sub-
stitute for delivery. The mere arrival of goods at their destination
is not sufficient to reduce the liability of the carrier to that of ware-
houseman. So long as anything remains to be done by the carrier as
carrier, before the goods are ready for acceptance by the consignee, the
carriers' liability continues, and not until the completion of this duty
of carrier with reference to the transportation of goods does any
question as to the reduction of the carrier's liability to that of ware-
houseman arise.
Where then does the liability of the railroad as carrier of goods
terminate and that of warehouseman begin?
There are three conflicting views as to how soon after the arrival
of goods at its destination, a railroad's responsibility changes from that
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of the common carrier to that of warehouseman, but no one of them
has been so generally accepted as to become the prevailing rule of court.
The so-called Massachusetts doctrine, so ably sdt forth by Chief.
Justice Shaw in Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co.,
1 Gray 263, and the rule that prevails in that and other states today is,
"that a common carrier is relieved of its extraordinary liability as an
insurer, whenever it has the goods intrusted to it safely deposited
in a safe warehouse." This doctrine pro.eeds on the theory that "the
deposit of goods in the carrier's warehouse is a quasi delivery to the
consignee's agent and absolves the carrier from all further liability
to the goods, except such as is assumed by its new relation; such a
delivery to itself as the consignee's warehouseman being in lieu of the
actual delivery required by common law." United Fruit Co. v. N. Y.
& B. Transp. Co., 104 Md. 567. Such a rule has the merits of being
definite and of easy application, and in many cases avoids contro-
versy, but it is sharply criticised on the ground that it puts an end to
the cairier's responsibility as such, just where that responsibility is
of the highest value to the shipper; for are there not as many or
more opportunities for collusion among the employees of the carrier
when the goods are in the warehouse, as when they are in a sealed car
in transit? It is for this and other reasons that the Massachusetts
doctrine is so strongly opposed. The opposing authorities, although
disagreeing as to the necessity of notice, are mutually concordant that
the carrir's responsibility as such continues after goods are placed in
carrier's warehouse, and until the consignee has had reasonable time in
which to remove the goods. In Moses v. Boston & Maine . R. Co.,
32 N. H. 523, it was held, "that the same broad principles of public
policy and convenience upon which the common law liability of the
carrier is made to rest, have equal application after the goods are re-
moved into the warehouse as before, until the consignee can have that
opportunity to remove the goods; and the same necessity exists for en-
couraging the fidelity and stimulating the care and diligence of those
who thus continue to retain them in charge by holding they shall con-
tinue subject to the risk." This in substance is the New Hampshire rule
and is also the one followed in Missouri today. Bell v. St. Louis and
I. M. R. Co., 6 Mo. App 363; Gashweiler v. Wabash, 83 Mo. 112.
The reason for this rule is "that the exact moment of the arrival can
seldom be known to the consignee, even if he does have notice of the
shipment; and it is unreasonable to compel him to remain at the car-
rier's depot awaiting the arrival of goods or to assume all the risks of
the uncertainties in the delay of transportation and time of arrival."
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Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Maris, 16 Kan. 333. If the goods have
arrived and been unloaded into the carrier's warehouse at night, the con-
signe cannot have known when they arrived or in what condition
they were in, and as the same persons-the servants of the company--
continue in exclusive possession and control of the goods as when they
were in transit, it is not only reasonable but an absolute necessity that
the carrier's responsibility continues until the consignee has had a
reasonable time to call for the goods.
"But, the rule being generally adopted today and furthermore
supported by the text-writers as the most consonant with sound rea-
son, is that the liability of a carrier continues until the consignee has
had a reasonable time in the common course of business to take them
away after such notification." McDonald v. W. R. R. Corp., 34 N. Y.
497; 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, p. 792. This rule, continuing the car-
rier's liability as such until the consignee has had reasonable time after
notification to take away his goods, is traceable to certain English
decisions having reference to carriers by water, whose mode of doing
business resembles that of railroad companies in the inability to pro-
ceed with their vehicles to every man's door and there deliver his
goods. And actual delivery to the consignee being impossible, the
land carriers for their own convenience and to facilitate traffic have
erected warehouses in which to place goods awaiting demand by the
consignee. But while holding these goods for delivery, is it just and
reasonable that the carrier should, without notice to the consignee,
terminate its liability as a carrier and press upon the consignee its
services as a warehouseman? The consignee cannot be in constant
attendance at the depot, and as stated by Mr. Justice Cooley in
McMillan v. M. S. & N. I. R. Co., 16 Mich 103, "to require the
consignee to watch from day to day the arrival of trains, and to renew
his inquiries respecting the consignment, seems to me to be imposing
a burden upon him without in the least relieving the carrier. Ior, it
can hardly be doubted that it would be less burdensome to the carrier
to be subjected to the numberless inquiries and examination of his
books, which would otherwise be necessary especially at important
points." In order therefore to avoid this burden, and at the same time
to impose diligence upon both the shipper and carrier without incon-
venience to either, we find the weight of authority recognizes certain
rules governing the delivery of goods at their place of destination, and
these may be summarized as follows: "If the consignee is present
upon the arrival of the goods, he must take them without unreasonable
delay. If he is not present, but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of
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the place of delivery, the carrier must notify him of the arrival
of the goods and has a reasonable time to take and remove them. It
he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, then the carrier may
place the goods in some warehouse, and, after keeping them a reason-
able time, if the owner does not call for them, its liability as a com-
mon carrier ceases, but if after the arrival the consignee has a reason-
able opportunity to remove them and does not, he cannot hold the
carrier as an insurer." Fenner v. Buffalo & State Line R. R. Co., 44
N. Y. 511.
Notice need not be served personally on the consignee, for it is
sufficient to deposit such notice in the postoffice properly addressed.
"If such notice is given to the wrong person, even if the latter person-
ates and falsely and fraudulently represents himself to be the con-
signee, such notice will not reduce the liability of the carrier to that
of warehouseman." Cavallaro v. Texas & P. Ry., 110 Cal. 348. The
necessity of giving notice is governed by general practice and usage at
the destination of the goods, and also by such contract as the shipper
and carrier may make in regard to notice, 'but in the absence of a com-
plete understanding between the parties, the consignee must be notified
of the arrival of the goods and be given a reasonable time in which to
carry them away.
What constitutes a reasonable time, must of course vary with the
circumstances of each particular case, but it has been held that the
convenience of the consignee will never be considered, nor will his
inability to carry away his goods. When the facts are agreed upon
or undisputed, it becomes a question to be determined by the court
as one of law; but where they are disputed and unsettled, the question
must be submitted to a jury.
K. P. SPENCER.
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